Study on Returns Policy Contract Mechanism in Biomass Supply Chain under Risk Preference

Article Preview

Abstract:

With the increasing development of biomass energy industry in both the world and China, it is significant to research on the contract design about biomass energy raw materials. In this paper, a two-stage supply chain under the returns policy contract mechanism is established firstly. It concerns the rife model of “base + famers” in China, which is based on economics and game theory. Secondly, the optimum order quantity of the leading part, base, is taken into major consideration so as to achieve the coordination of the supply chain, under the condition of different risk preference. Finally, a numerical analysis is provided to help conclude an optimal coordination strategy and ensure the effectiveness of the strategy.

You might also be interested in these eBooks

Info:

Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 361-363)

Pages:

1950-1953

Citation:

Online since:

October 2011

Export:

Price:

Permissions CCC:

Permissions PLS:

Сopyright:

© 2012 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

Share:

Citation:

[1] Berndes G, Hoogwijk M, van den Broek R. The contribution of biomass in the future global energy supply: a review of 17 studies. Biomass and Bioenergy 2003; 25:1–28.

DOI: 10.1016/s0961-9534(02)00185-x

Google Scholar

[2] Allen J, Browne M, Hunter A, Boyd J, Palmer H. Logistics management and costs of biomass fuel supply. International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management 1998; 28(6):463–77

DOI: 10.1108/09600039810245120

Google Scholar

[3] Cundiff J, Dias N, Sherali H. A linear programming approach for designing a herbaceous biomass delivery system. Bioresource Technology 1997,59,47–55

DOI: 10.1016/s0960-8524(96)00129-0

Google Scholar

[4] Caputo A, Palumbo M, Pelagagge P, Scacchia F. Economics of biomass energy utilization in combustion and gasification plants: effects of logistics variables. Biomass and Bioenergy 2005,28,35–51

DOI: 10.1016/j.biombioe.2004.04.009

Google Scholar

[5] Athanasios A. Rentizelas ,Athanasios J. Tolis, Ilias P. Tatsiopoulos. Logistics issues of biomass: The storage problem and the multi-biomass supply chain. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 13 (2009) 887–894

DOI: 10.1016/j.rser.2008.01.003

Google Scholar

[6] Cachon, G. amdLariviere, M. (2000). Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts strengths and cinitations [R]. Philadelphia University of Penn-sylvania, (2000)

Google Scholar

[7] Ye, Fei (2006). Research on Revenue Sharing Contract Mechanism of Supply Chain with Risk Averse Agent [J]. Industrial Engineering and Mamagement, 2006, 11 (4) :50254

Google Scholar

[8] Sheng Xuxiong. Study on the entrepreneur's risk preference, incentive motivation and market constraints. Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics Academic Journal, 1997,5: 39-43.

Google Scholar

[9] Yang zhiyu, Ma shihua. Study on the Principal-agent Problem in Supply Chain Enterprises. CIMS.2001,7( 1):19 -22

Google Scholar

[10] Zhang Jing. Study on Supply Chain Coordination and Incentive under Asymmetric Risk Preference. Master Degree thesis of Nanjing University of Science and Technology, (2007)

Google Scholar

[11] He Yong. Studied on supply chain contract with random market demand PhD. Degree thesis of Dalian University of Science and Technology, (2004)

Google Scholar

[12] YU Ming-jin, WANG Ju-xiang, SANG Sheng-ju. Study on Revenue Sharing Contract Mechanism in Supply Chain under risk Preference. SCIENCETECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING 2008, 8(22)

Google Scholar