Analysis on the Incompleteness of Moral Hazard Model

Yi Fang Tang; Ai He Wang; Yan Li; Yu Mei Hu

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.683.733

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vol. 683Analysis on the Incompleteness of Moral Hazard...

Analysis on the Incompleteness of Moral Hazard Model

Abstract:

Moral hazard model is an important model in contract design. Starting from the result set of the moral hazard contract, this paper analyzes the incompleteness of moral hazard contract which is with great practical significance. Our results show that if the contracting parties can’t reach a consensus on the possible outcomes of the future (i.e. the result set of contract), some efficiency contract (or agreement) may not be realized.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volume 683)

Pages:

733-736

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.683.733

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Online since:

April 2013

Authors:

Yi Fang Tang, Ai He Wang, Yan Li, Yu Mei Hu

Keywords:

Contract, Incompleteness, Moral Hazard Model

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