A Pushback Slot Allocation Equilibrium Model Based on Game Theory

Article Preview

Abstract:

This paper analyses the relationship between airport and airline, the time slot allocation system is portrayed as a market where the airline can be seen as consumer, airport can be seen as the trader and the goods is the occupied pushback slots of airport. In that case, the generalized nash equilibrium game is presented based on game theory. Taking the Minimize delay as a target, a decision models of airport was established. The pushback slot allocation equilibrium model based on game theory is finnally formed, and a framework for solving the equilibrium solution is proposed.

You might also be interested in these eBooks

Info:

Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 807-809)

Pages:

2858-2862

Citation:

Online since:

September 2013

Export:

Price:

Permissions CCC:

Permissions PLS:

Сopyright:

© 2013 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

Share:

Citation:

[1] C. Cros and C. Frings. Alternative taxiing means-Engines stopped. The Airbus workshop on Alternative taxiing means–Engines stopped (2008), p.121.

Google Scholar

[2] http: /www. chinacir. com. (2012).

Google Scholar

[3] China aviation industry group co., LTD. Civil aircraft market forecast in 2011-2030. Aviation manufacturing technology (2011) pp.112-113.

Google Scholar

[4] http: /www. caac. gov. cn/I1/K3/201105/t20110504_39489. html.

Google Scholar

[5] HuangTao. Game tutorial-Theory and application. Beijing: Press of CUEB (2004).

Google Scholar

[6] Ioannis Simaiakis. Modeling and control of Airport Departure Processes for Emissions Reduction. Master Thesis: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts (2009).

Google Scholar

[7] HarkerPT. Generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities. European journal of operational Research Vol. l (1991), pp.81-94.

DOI: 10.1016/0377-2217(91)90325-p

Google Scholar