The Game Analysis for Financial Fraud Behavior of CPAs under the Shareholder Selecting Pattern

Ping Chen; Shuang Liang Tian

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.926-930.4032

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 926-930The Game Analysis for Financial Fraud Behavior of...

The Game Analysis for Financial Fraud Behavior of CPAs under the Shareholder Selecting Pattern

Abstract:

CPAs enjoy higher audit independence under the shareholders selecting pattern, which is widely used in developed countries. According to the characteristics of shareholders selecting pattern, as well as that of listing companies’ managers and CPAs, we established asymmetric evolutionary game model between managers and CPAs, and researched the paths and the mechanism which two players’ behavior evolved respectively. Based on this, we discussed the forming conditions of financial fraud.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 926-930)

Pages:

4032-4036

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.926-930.4032

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Online since:

May 2014

Authors:

Ping Chen, Shuang Liang Tian*

Keywords:

CPA, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, Financial Fraud, Manger, Shareholders Selecting Pattern

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* - Corresponding Author

References

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