The Allocation Principle of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Responsibilities and International Coalition Patten in the Following 40 Years

Abstract:

The allocation principle of greenhouse gas emission reduction responsibilities decides the effective of abatement program, but it is the most controversial problem in climate negotiation. Three common principles are compared in this paper, with the conclusion that allocation according to per capita and allocation according to grandfathering will not be accepted by the whole world, although common but differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing countries can not form a grand abatement coalition, it can effectively control the rise of temperature, and the impact to each countries’ economy is the smallest among the three principle.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 962-965)
• Pages: 1410-1418
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.962-965.1410
• Online since: June 2014
• Authors: Yuan Yuan*, Ji Xian Liu, Zhang Fang
• Keywords: Game Theory, Lindahl Equilibrium, Principle of Greenhouse Gas Emission, Rice Model, VCG Mechanism

References

[1] S. J. Liu, Y. S. Zhang Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction: A Theoretical Framework and Global Solution [J]. Economic Research Journal, 2009 (03): 4-13.

[2] Z. L. Ding, X. N. Duan, Q. S. Ge, Assessment of International Emissions Reduction Program and the Discussion of Long-term Greenhouse Gas Rights for China, [J]. SCIENCE IN CHINA PRESS: D, 2009, 39(12): 1659-1671.

[3] K. S. Li. the Equitable Sharing of Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Responsibilities: from the View of Rawls' Theory of Justice [J]. World Economics and Politics, 2012 (3): 39-56.

[4] Samuelson P A. The pure theory of public expenditure[J]. The review of economics and statistics, 1954: 387-389.

[5] Lindahl E. Just taxation—a positive solution[J]. Classics in the theory of public finance, 1919, 134: 168-76.

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-23426-4_11

[6] Foley, D. Resource Allocation and the Public Sector[J]. Yale Economic Essays, 1967: 43-98.

[7] Buchholz W, Cornes R, Peters W. Lindahl equilibrium versus voluntary contribution to a public good: The role of the income distribution[J]. FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2006, 62(1): 28-49.

DOI: 10.1628/001522106776666997

[8] Johansen, Leif. Some Notes on the Lindahl Theory of Determination of Public Expenditures[J]. International Economic Review, 1963(9): 346-358.

DOI: 10.2307/2525312

[9] Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders[J]. The Journal of finance, 1961, 16(1): 8-37.

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x

[10] Clarke E H. Multipart pricing of public goods[J]. Public choice, 1971, 11(1): 17-33.

DOI: 10.1007/bf01726210

[11] Groves T. Incentives in teams[J]. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1973: 617-631.

[12] Groves T, Loeb M. Incentives and public inputs[J]. journal of Public Economics, 1975, 4(3): 211-226.

DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8

[13] Nordhaus W D. Estimates of the social cost of carbon: background and results from the RICE-2011 model[R]. National Bureau of Economic Research, (2011).

DOI: 10.3386/w17540

[14] J. K. He, B. Liu. Analysis on the Situation in the Near Future and the Trends in the Long Term with Regard of Mitigating Carbon Emissions in China [J]. CHINA POPULATION, RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 2006, 16(6): 153-157.

[15] Z. Wang. Economics Analysis of climate protection [M]. Science Press, (2010).