Research on Multi-Unit Auction Theory and Application

Abstract:

Auctions usually involve the sale of many homogeneous or heterogeneous objects. Spectrum, treasury, and electricity auctions are examples. This kind of auctions is so-called multi-unit auctions. In order to know the research history and the newest research trends for the study on multi-unit auctions, this paper presents widespread theoretical and applications problems of multi-unit auctions. The multi-unit auction models are divided into two kinds (i.e. sequential auction and simultaneous auction). Assumptions, main ideas, and conclusions of literature related to these two kinds of models are reviewed and commented.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 58-60)
• Pages: 376-381
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.58-60.376
• Online since: June 2011
• Authors: Cong Jun Rao, Yue Zheng
• Keywords: Multi-Unit Auction, Sequential Auction, Simultaneous Auction

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