Optimal Model of Selecting Developers in New Product Development

Abstract:

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In new product development, the asymmetric information between the firms and developers is inherent. It always leads to failure for choosing the developers. If a firm selects the wrong developer with shortcomings in the team, technology, market, etc, then it will lead to the deviation from the expected results in the development of new product in terms of performance, cost and schedule, and cause imponderable financial loss. This paper presents an incentive optimal model of choosing the developers in new product development based on multi-attribute auction. Then the firm can incentive developers reporting the real information, and choose the optimal developers.

Info:

Periodical:

Edited by:

Qi Luo

Pages:

382-386

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.58-60.382

Citation:

C. J. Rao and H. B. Liu, "Optimal Model of Selecting Developers in New Product Development", Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vols. 58-60, pp. 382-386, 2011

Online since:

June 2011

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Price:

$35.00

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