Studies on Commercial District Alliance Governance and Integration Governance Mode Selection

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Abstract:

In the actual course of commercial operations, governance mode is mainly divided into two categories: alliance mode, leading by real estate developer, and integrated mode, leading by commercial operators. The transaction efficiency and cost vary corresponding to the different mode. In this paper, based on the traditional market, hybrid and hierarchical mode framework in transaction cost theory, inframarginal theory and the actual Chinese commercial management, the author discusses the existing conditions of market, hybrid and hierarchical mode, verifies that the complete market mode in the actual operation process does not exist, at the same time, deeply analyses boundary conditions for the existence and basis for decision making of the alliance mode and integration mode.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 181-182)

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507-515

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Online since:

January 2011

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© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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