Equilibrium Strategies of Contract Choice Game between Supply Chains with Uncertain Demand

Abstract:

Applying competing newsvendor model, we studied the contract choice games between supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. We investigated the effect of the competition intensity on the equilibrium strategies of contract choice games. It can be found that, counter to the earlier literature, in the context of competing supply chains, the choices of quantity-discount contracts are the Nash equilibrium structure for both manufacturers, however, the manufacturers will get into classic prisoners’ dilemma if the degree of competition intensity is high.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 655-657)
• Pages: 2348-2351
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.655-657.2348
• Online since: January 2013
• Authors: Bai Xun Li, Qi Wei, Min Zhou
• Keywords: Contract Choice Game, Quantity-Discount Contract, Supply Chain, Uncertain Demand, Wholesale-Price Contract

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