Research for Trans-Boundary Water Pollution Cooperation

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Abstract:

Based on Stakelberg framework,this paper dynamically described the Government's interests by differential game,then made a comprehensive analysis on the equilibrium of cooperation and noncooperation.At last,it holds that cooperation is an effective way to solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, in order to cooperate, central government should take some policies and measures for controlling trans-boundary water pollution .

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 864-867)

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1525-1530

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December 2013

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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